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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant Bertha Washington ("Washington") appeals the 
decision of the Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department, 
State of Utah. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code §78-2a-3(2)(d). 
STATEMENTS OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Is a liquidated damages clause unconscionable which 
penalizes a residential tenant an arbitrary amount beyond the 
rent actually due? 
Because the unconscionability of an act or practice is a 
question of law for the court pursuant to the Utah Consumer Sales 
Practices Act, Utah Code §13-11-5(2), the court should review 
under the "correctness" standard, affording the trial court's 
conclusions of law no particular deference* State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
2• Is the Reid itemized method of calculating damages after 
a lease is broken the exclusive remedy for a landlord? Reid v. 
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). 
Because the trial court's decision on this issue rests on 
interpretation of a Supreme Court decision and applicable law, 
the court should review under the "correctness" standard, 
affording the trial court's conclusions of law no particular 
deference. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are controlling in this action: 
Utah Code §13-11-3 
Utah Code §13-11-5 
Utah Code §70A-2a-504 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellee Woodhaven Apartments ("Woodhaven") and Washington 
entered into a lease agreement for a period commencing May 30, 
1991, to May 15, 1992. [Tr. 7] Washington resided at Woodhaven 
until Woodhaven's agent verbally informed Washington that her 
lease would be terminated based upon too many people living in 
2 
the apartment. [Tr. 52] Accordingly, Washington vacated the 
apartment on October 31, 1991. [Tr. 55] Woodhaven subsequently 
rerented the apartment on November 15, 1991. [Tr. 26] Woodhaven 
then charged Washington $705.30 when the lease was terminated. 
[Tr. 46] The total amount is broken down as follows: fifteen 
days of rent until the apartment was rerented, the damages 
incurred within the apartment and a $531.00 "relet fee" based 
upon the lease. [Tr. 45-6] Woodhaven brought suit against 
Washington to collect the $705.30. [Tr. 1] The trial court 
found for Woodhaven. Washington now appeals the trial court's 
decision. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable William 
A. Thorne on July 15, 1993, in the Third Circuit Court, West 
Valley Department. The Court heard testimony from numerous 
witnesses, including the parties. Following this testimony and 
closing arguments from counsel, the Court entered its decision on 
November 12, 1993 and the decision is the subject of this appeal. 
C. Statement of the Pacts 
Woodhaven brought this action for damages pursuant to a 
lease agreement between the parties after Washington vacated the 
apartment prior to the end of the lease term. [Tr. 7] These 
damages consisted of rent until the apartment was rerented, 
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claimed costs of damages and repairs, and a "termination fee" of 
one and one-half months rent, pursuant to paragraph 26 of the 
lease. [Tr. 45-6] Washington admitted she owed the rent until 
rerented, denied she caused the damages and argued that the 
liquidated damages clause was unconscionable pursuant to the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act (UCSPA), Utah Code §13-11-5. 
[Tr. 63-7] Woodhaven argued that this clause was commonly used 
in lease agreements and was not unconscionable. [Tr. 48-9] 
The trial court found Woodhaven to be a supplier under the 
UCSPA. [R. 134] The trial court found that Woodhaven had not 
proven that any damages to the property were the responsibility 
of Washington and found that the UCSPA applied to this 
transaction but that the liquidated damages clause was not 
unconscionable. [R. 134-6] Judgment was entered for the unpaid 
rent, for the liquidated damages of $531.00, for court costs and 
for attorney fees, less credit for a payment and for a deposit, 
leaving a total judgment against Washington of $819.00. [R. 139] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This court should reverse the lower court's decision because 
the liquidated damages clause contained in Woodhaven's lease is 
unconscionable. The clause works as a penalty because it bears 
no reasonable relationship to the actual damages sustained by 
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Woodhaven. Therefore, this court should find that this 
unconscionable clause is in violation of the UCSPA. 
Moreover, this court should reverse the trial court's 
decision regarding the measure of damages and follow the holding 
of the Utah Supreme Court in Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins, Co., 
776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). The court should hold that an 
itemization of actual damages is the exclusive remedy for a 
landlord in Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
WOODHAVEN'S LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSE 
VIOLATES THE UTAH CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT 
The trial court found that the Utah Consumer Sales Practices 
Act (UCSPA) applies to residential leases. Specifically, the 
trial court found that Woodhaven was a "supplier" as defined in 
Utah Code Ann. §13-11-3(6). [R. 134] The trial court further 
found that the leasing agreement was a "consumer transaction" as 
defined in Utah Code Ann. §13-11-3(2). [R. 135] The trial 
court's finding is consistent with statements of Justices Durham 
and Zimmerman of the Utah Supreme Court in Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 
1006 (Utah 1991). Although the trial court correctly held that 
the UCSPA applied to residential lease transactions, it ruled 
incorrectly that the liquidated damages clause was not 
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unconscionable. 
A. Woodhaven's Liquidated Damages Clause is Void 
Because It Works as a Penalty» 
Woodhaven's liquidated damages clause, lease paragraph 26, 
charges a flat one and one-half months rent for tenants who 
vacate the premises prior to their lease expiration date. 
[R. 11] Woodhaven's measure of charges, paragraph 26, is not 
designed as a reasonable measure of anticipated damages but as a 
penalty to the breaching party. The Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC), codified in Utah at Utah Code §70A-2a-5G4, defines 
liquidated damages as "an amount or . . . a formula that is 
reasonable in light of the then anticipated harm caused by the 
default or other act or omission." Utah Code §70A-2a-504(1) 
1. Woodhaven's clause was not in a reasonably 
anticipated amount. 
Following the UCC, Woodhaven's liquidated damages clause is 
a penalty. First, the one and one-half times charge is 
unreasonably large considering the fact Woodhaven had the 
apartment in question on the market for around only fifteen days 
before the next tenancy began. Because Utah is suffering a 
severe shortage of available apartments, rerental within such a 
short period was to be expected. Moreover, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that a landlord has a duty to mitigate damages in 
the landlord-tenant setting. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 
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776 P.2d 896, 906 (Utah 1989). The Reid court further held that 
to not require a landlord to mitigate damages is "analogous to 
imposing a disfavored penalty upon the tenant." Id. 
Accordingly, allowing Woodhaven to collect such a "re-let" fee 
would be allowing it to collect the exact type of penalty 
disfavored by the Utah Supreme Court. 
More specifically, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a 
liquidated damages clause bearing no relation to the actual 
damages sustained is unenforceable. Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 
468, 243 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1952). 
Perkins involved a contract for purchase of real estate that 
contained a clause for forfeiture of the down payment if the 
purchasing party breached the contract. Perkins held that for a 
liquidated damages clause to be enforceable, it must satisfy two 
prongs. First, it must bear "some reasonable relation to the 
actual damages which could reasonably be anticipated at the time 
the contract was made[.]" Second, the liquidated damages clause 
must not be "a forfeiture which would allow an unconscionable and 
exorbitant (sic) recovery." Perkins, 243 P.2d at 449. 
This court should follow the dictates of the Utah Supreme 
Court in Perkins and find that Woodhaven's liquidated damages 
clause is unenforceable because it fails to meet the standards 
set forth in Perkins. Woodhaven's liquidated damages clause 
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bears no reasonable relationship to the actual damages suffered, 
thus should be considered an "unconscionable and exorbitant 
recovery." Id. 
Through the liquidated damages clause, Woodhaven received 
double rent payments for the period of November 16 through 
November 30, 1991. There can be no doubt that Woodhaven did not 
"mitigate damages" in the legal sense because to legally 
"mitigate damages" means to help relieve the burden upon the 
breaching party. Woodhaven admits that a new tenant had rented 
the premises by November 16, 1991, therefore the $531.00 charged 
to Washington becomes nothing more than a penalty disguised as a 
termination fee. 
B, Washington Lacked a Meaningful Choice Regarding 
Woodhavenys Liquidated Damages Clause. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that unconscionability 
includes the absence of a meaningful choice on the part of one of 
the parties together with the contract terms which are 
unreasonably favorable to the other party. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. 
Huth, 664 P.2d 445 (Utah 1983). According to the Utah Supreme 
Court's interpretation of unconscionability factors, Washington 
lacked a meaningful choice when she signed Woodhaven's 
residential lease. 
Washington signed Woodhaven's lease during a severe housing 
shortage. At present and at the time in question, there was a 
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severe shortage of available apartments in the Salt Lake area. 
Washington had no choice regarding what terms would be included 
in her leases because of the tight housing market, and the form 
contract that was used. The liquidated damages clause was just 
another paragraph of a typical boiler-plate, closely printed 
lease agreement that favored the management. As indicated above, 
Woodhaven was quick to point out some paragraphs in the lease but 
neglected to point out the penalty clause that instigated this 
action. 
To claim that Washington had a meaningful choice in signing 
a lease that contained a penalty clause during the tight housing 
situation is to strip the UCSPA of its intended protections, in 
complete disregard for the law. Washington had no meaningful 
choice when she affixed her signature on Woodhaven's lease. 
The penalty clause contained in the lease should be declared 
unconscionable. 
C. Collection of Woodhaven'& Liquidated Damages Clause is a 
Deceptive and Unconscionable Act as Contemplated in the 
UCSPA, 
The Utah Legislature enacted the UCSPA to protect consumers 
from deceptive and unconscionable acts. Woodhaven's liquidated 
damages clause falls into the category of deceptive and 
unconscionable acts because it is a penalty, not a true 
liquidated damages clause. 
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Courts will not enforce penalty clauses, as indicated in 
California and Massachusetts Supreme Court rulings. These courts 
have held that an unfair and deceptive practice occurs when 
landlords include illegal and unenforceable terms in leases. See 
People v. McKale, 602 P.2d 731 (Cal. 1980) (unfair practice 
occurs when tenants could be deceived as to mobile home park 
operator's authority to enforce illegal agreement terms); Leardi 
v. Brown, 474 N.E.2d 1094 (Mass. 1985). See also, Commonwealth 
v. De Cotis, 316 N.E.2d 748 (Mass. 1974) (fee for resale of 
mobile home deceptive where services not rendered). 
Woodhaven's inclusion of liquidated damages clause in its 
residential leases renders such practice deceptive and 
unconscionable pursuant to the UCSPA. 
POINT TWO 
THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR A UTAH LANDLORD 
IN BREACH OF LEASE SITUATION IS 
ITEMIZATION OF CALCULATED DAMAGES 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the methodology for 
calculating damages after a breached lease in Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). Reid held that in a 
breached lease situation, the landlord retains the burden of 
proving specific damages and that proper mitigation efforts were 
taken. This burden is satisfied only through an active, 
affirmative showing on the landlord's side. The Reid court 
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supported the landlord's right to collect rent until the premises 
are rerented, as well as costs of repairs and advertising to find 
new tenants. However, the Reid court held that to collect 
monetary damages beyond that stated above, the landlord must 
institute supplemental proceedings to prove such damages have 
occurred even with reasonable mitigation efforts. Reid, 776 P.2d 
at 906. The trial court's ruling allowing Woodhaven to collect 
under the liquidated damages clause is in direct conflict with 
this decision from the Utah Supreme Court. 
The trial court improperly applied the law when it granted 
complete judgment to Woodhaven. Woodhaven seeks from Washington 
expenses for repairs, full amount of rent from October 31, 1991, 
through November 16, 1991, when the premises were rerented, and 
$531.00 under the liquidated damages clause. Reid prevents 
Woodhaven from collecting under the liquidated damages clause 
unless it can prove specific damages. Woodhaven admits that it 
cannot. [Tr. 43-4] 
Because Woodhaven cannot prove specific damages and because 
its liquidated damages clause works as a penalty, this court 
should rule consistently with the dictates of the Utah Supreme 
Court and reverse the trial court's decision. 
11 
CONCLUSION 
This court should reverse the lower court's decision and 
rule that Woodhaven's liquidated damages clause is unconscionable 
and contrary to Utah law as expressed in Reid, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~7 day of f Lr^^^^1 1994. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES 
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A3 used m this chapter 
(1) 'Charitable solicitation' means any re-
quest directly or indirectly for money, credit, 
property, financial assistance, or any other thing 
of value on the plea or representation that it will 
be used for a charitable purpose A charitable 
solicitation may be made in any manner, includ-
ing. 
(a) any oral or written request, including 
a telephone request, 
(b) the distribution, circulation, or posting 
of any handbill, written advertisement, or 
publication, 
(c) the sale of, offer or attempt to sell, or 
request of donations for any book, card, 
chance, coupon, device, magazine, member-
ship, merchandise, subscription, ticket, 
flower, flag, button, sticker, nbbon, token, 
trinket, tag, souvenir, candy, or any other 
article in connection with which any appeal 
is made for any charitable purpose, or where 
the name of any charitable organization or 
movement is used or referred to as an in-
ducement or reason for making any purchase 
donation or where, in connection with any 
sale or donation, any statement is made that 
the whole or any part of the proceeds of any 
sale or donation will go to or be donated to 
any charitable purpose A charitable solicita-
tion is considered complete when made, 
whether or not the organization or person 
making the solicitation receives any contri-
bution or makes any sale 
(2) Consumer transaction* means a sale, 
lease assignment, award by chance, or other 
written or oral transfer or disposition of goods, 
services, or other property, both tangible and in-
tangible (except securities and insurance) to a 
person for primarily personal, family or house-
hold purposes or for purposes that relate to a 
business opportunity that requires both his ex-
penditure of money or property and his personal 
services on a continuing basis and in which he 
has not been Dreviouslv engaged, or a solicitation 
or offer bv a suDDher with respect to any of these 
transfers or dispositions It includes any offer or 
solicitation anv agreement anv oerformance of 
an agreement with respect to anv of these trans-
fers or dispositions and an> cnantable solicita-
tion as defined in this section 
'3) Enforcing authority' means the Division 
of Consumer Protection 
<4> Final judgment1 means a judgment, in-
cluding anv supporting opinion that determines 
the rights of the parties and concerning which 
appellate remedies have been exhausted or the 
time for appeal has expired 
5 Person means an individual corporation 
government, governmental subdivision or 
agencv business trust estate trust partnership 
association cooperative or any other legal en-
titv 
(6) 'Supplier* means a seller lessor assignor, 
offeror broker or other person who regularly so-
licits engages in or enforces consumer transac-
tions whether or not he deals directly with the 
consumer 1987 
13-11-5. Unconscionable act or practice by sup-
plier. 
(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a supplier 
in connection with a consumer transaction violates 
this act whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction. 
(2) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a 
question of law for the court. If it is claimed or ap-
pears to the court that an act or practice may be un-
conscionable, the parties shall be given a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence as to its setting, pur-
pose, and effect to aid the court in making its deter-
mination. 
(3) In determining whether an act or practice is 
unconscionable, the court shall consider circum-
stances which the supplier knew or had reason to 
know. 1973 
ADDENDUM 2-1 
70A-2a-504. Liquidation of damages. 
(1) Damages payable by either party for default, or any other act or omis-
sion, including indemnity for loss or diminution of anticipated tax benefits or 
loss or damage to lessor's residual interest, may be liquidated in the lease 
agreement, but only at an amount or by a formula that is reasonable in light 
of the then anticipated harm caused by the default or other act or omission. 
(2) If the lease agreement provides for liquidation of damages, and such 
provision does not comply with Subsection (1), or such provision is an exclu-
sive or limited remedy that circumstances cause to fail of its essential pur-
pose, remedy may be had as provided in this chapter. 
(3) If the lessor justifiably withholds or stops delivery of goods because of 
the lessee's default or insolvency as provided in Section 70A-2a-525 or 
70A-2a-526, the lessee is entitled to restitution of any amount by which the 
sum of his payments exceeds: 
(a) the amount to which the lessor is entitled by virtue of terms liqui-
dating the lessor's damages in accordance with Subsection (1); or 
(b) in the absence of those terms, 20 percent of the then present value 
of the total rent the lessee was obligated to pay for the balance of the 
lease term, or, in the case of a consumer lease, the lesser of such amount 
or $500. 
(4) A lessee's right to restitution under Subsection (3) is subject to offset to 
he extent the lessor establishes: 
(a) a right to recover damages under the provisions of this chapter 
other than Subsection (1); and 
(b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the lessee directly 
or indirectly by reason of the lease contract. 
History: C. 1953, 70A-2a-504, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 197, 
. 1990, ch. 197, § 53. § 82 makes the act effective on July 1, 1990. 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 













Case No. 920005207 
The above-entitled matter is an action for damages resulting from the early termination 
of a residential lease. Associated issues raised by the parties included application of a 
liquidated damages provision in the lease, application of a consumer protection statutory 
scheme to the transaction, and whether the lease was unconscionable. 
This matter came to trial on July 15, 1993. Plaintiff was represented by James Deans 
and Defendant was represented by Bruce Plenk. Several pretrials conferences were held on 
this matter with the attorneys.1 An extended time period was provided for filing of motions 
and supporting memoranda to accommodate the change of counsel and juggling of attorney 
and court calendars. Prior to the time of trial, the court determined after review of 
memoranda from both Plaintiff and Defendant, that the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act2 
applied to the lease in this case. The court found that Woodhaven Apartments was a 
"supplier" as defined in Utah Code Ann. Sec 13-11-3(6). The court also found that the 
1
 Plaintiff was previously represented by Martin Pezeley, who appeared several times and 
filed some of the many motions and briefs in this matter. 
2
 13-11-1 et seq., U.C.A. (1992). 
ADDENDUM 5 - 1 
leasing agreement at issue was a "consumer transaction" as defined in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
13-11-3(2). 
ISSUES 
Plaintiff claimed actual property damages of S705.00 plus a re-let fee of $531.00, 
calculated at 1 1/2 months rental rate, per the lease contract. Defendant countered that the 
contract was unconscionable, and that the Plaintiff was liable under the UCSPA for the 
minimum damages provided in the Act. Defendant also argued that the only monetary 
remedy available for a broken lease was a damage finding based upon actual expenses 
attributable to the specific broken lease, including rent until the premises were re-let. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
A lease was entered into by Defendant on May 30, 1991, for an apartment in the 
Woodhaven Apartment complex. Paragraph 26 in the lease agreement, which appeared 
immediately above the signature line, provided for an assessment of 1 1/2 months rent for 
early termination of the lease when the property is re-let prior to the termination date of the 
lease. Defendant and co-tenant paid a deposit of $354.00, $25.00 of which was termed non-
refundable, at the time of moving into the apartment. The term of the lease was to expire on 
May 14, 1992. The monthly rental on the apartment unit was to be $354.00 per month. 
Defendant vacated the apartment on November 1, 1991. Rent had been paid at the regular 
rate through October 15, 1991. The apartment was re-let on November 15, 1991. Plaintiff 
claimed property damages of $705.00, but was unable to support the claim with itemized 
invoices or receipts. Nor was plaintiff able to show the condition of the premises prior to 
defendant occupying the premises. 
2 
ADDENDUM 5-2 
Defendant's co-tenant signed a written agreement entitled "Agreement To Accept 
Partial Rent Payment" on October 21. In the agreement Plaintiffs agent agreed to accept 
S200 that same day and a balance of $179.00 by the 31st of October. The $200 was paid, 
but the balance per the agreement was never paid. Defendant did not sign the agreement, 
although the plaintiff believed that the co-tenant was acting on behalf of the Defendant. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Defendant argues that the lease agreement, specifically the provision in Paragraph 26 
dealing with an assessment of 1 1/2 months rental for early termination of the lease, is 
unconscionable and violates the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (UCSPA). 
The Court hereby finds that the contested provision is not unconscionable. The terms, 
while not particularly well drafted, are not deceptive or misleading. It is the last substantive 
provision appearing before the signature. There was no apparent attempt to bury the 
provision in the body of the lease. While the better practice might have been to place the 
liquidated damages provision in bold letters, or require that initials be placed in the margin to 
draw attention to the clause, the lack of these steps does not render the provision 
unconscionable. There is no complicated formula to be applied. Even a cursory reading 
would put a tenant on notice that there is a penalty for early termination of the lease. The 
contract is not an adhesion contract, the tenants were not forced to rent from a complex 
offering patently offensive terms. In the absence of compelling evidence the court must 
assume that other rental properties were available in the Salt Lake housing market at the time 
Defendant chose to lease from Plaintiff. 
3 
ADDENDUM 5-3 
Plaintiff, whenever there is an early termination of a lease agreement, incurs costs 
over and above those normally associated with providing residential housing. Plaintiff 
reasonably could anticipate incurring these costs only when the lease terminates at the 
expiration of the lease term. Plaintiff is required to clean the premises, perform whatever 
minor repairs are necessary to make the unit attractive to a prospective tenant, perform the 
necessary administrative details to ensure that the work is properly and timely done, advertise 
for the vacancy, have personnel available to show the apartment to prospective tenants, 
prepare the necessary paperwork for the prospective tenant, perform various checks of 
prospective tenants, etc. All of these duties draw upon the resources of the plaintiff. 
Incurring these costs sooner than anticipated when the lease is terminated early results in 
added costs and expenses for a landlord. 
Plaintiff is then faced with deciding how best to cover the costs associated with early 
terminations. Plaintiff might charge higher rental fees for all tenants, to cover the costs of 
early terminations.3 Or Plaintiff might keep exacting accounting records of individualized 
costs related to each individual rental unit. 
For good policy reasons, the law applicable to this case should not be interpreted to 
require that a plaintiff increase potential costs by requiring an exacting accounting of time and 
effort for each unit, unless there is an express requirement in the controlling statutes or 
contract. Plaintiff should be entitled to take reasonable steps to minimize the accounting costs 
by spreading duplicative activities over the entire complex operational expenses. Nor should 
3
 This, however, would result in higher fees being charged to all tenants. It is not 
unreasonable for Plaintiff to resist charging all tenants for the costs associated with the actions 
of only a few, the early terminations. 
4 
ADDENDUM 5-4 
the law require that separate incremental advertising costs be incurred for each individual 
unit. Paragraph 26, the liquidated damage provision, appears to be a means of minimizing 
these costs. In an individual case this may result in a cost savings or increase for an early 
terminating tenant.4 This practice does not rise to the level of unconscionable action in this 
case.5 The liquidated damages provision at issue is interpreted by this court as a replacement 
for the normal costs which otherwise are routine expenses associated with an early lease 
termination. Itemized costs would not, therefore, be allowed in addition to liquidated 
damages except for unusual or intentionally malicious damages. 
The provision is not, as a matter of law, unconscionable. An assessment of 1 1/2 
months rental is not out of proportion to the effort and resources that must be expended to re-
rent the premises. The contract did not grant arbitrary and unfettered rights to the plaintiff, 
nor was the contract one that raised the spectre of procedural unconscionability.6 This 
liquidated damages provision of the contract does not shock the conscience as being unfair or 
oppressive. Additionally, there was no evidence that the supplier was in a position where it 
knew or should have known that the contract provision was unconscionable. 
4
 For example the complex need not run a separate newspaper ad for each vacant apartment, 
but may rather run one ad. The resultant cost might result in a per apartment cost that varies 
depending upon the number of vacancies at any one time. If there were several apartments 
vacant, the cost would be shared among all the vacant apartments, thus a smaller per unit cost. 
If there were only one vacant unit, the per unit cost would be higher. The same could be applied 
to the salaries of employees to show the apartments and other associated costs. 
5
 In a one or two unit apartment building the legal conclusion may not necessarily be the 
same. 
6
 Resource Management Company v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Company. Inc.. 706 P. 
2d 1028 (Utah, 1985). 
5 
ADDENDUM 5-5 
At the conclusion of the hearing the court was prepared to issue a ruling from the 
bench, but was persuaded that the issue of exclusive remedy, as raised in Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896 (Utah, 1989), should be examined. After review of Reid . 
this court is not convinced that the current caselaw in Utah specifies itemized damages as the 
exclusive remedy in cases involving breaches of residential leases. 
Computation of Damages 
The liquidated damages clause in the lease agreement does not violate the provisions 
of UCSPA, and will therefore be applied in assessing the damages resulting from the early 
termination of the lease agreement. The damages provision in the agreement sets the 
measurement of damages at 1 1/2 months rent. The rental rate was SQt by contract at $354, 
times 1 1/2 months equals $541.00 in liquidated damages. In addition Defendant is liable for 
the one month of rent from the end of her paid up time until the apartment was re-let. The 
filing fee of $15.00 together with 59.00 in service of process fees results in $24.00 of court 
costs to be added to the judgement damages. Defendant had previously paid $329.00 in 
refundable deposits. Defendant should also be given credit for the $200.00 paid by co-tenant 
at the time notice of intent to leave was given. Applying the deposit as an offset, leaves a 
balance due of $389.00 owed by Defendant to Plaintiff.7 
7
 $531 liquidated damages 
354 rent unpaid Oct 15 to Nov 15 
24 court costs 
$909 total owed 
-$329 refundable deposit 
- 200 paid by co-tenant 
$389 Judgement 
6 
Attorney fees for the prevailing party are provided in the rental agreement. The court 
finds that the attorney fees in this case should be apportioned. Defendant succeeded in 
applying the UCSPA to the contract, over the objection of Plaintiff. Plaintiff succeeded in 
resisting a finding of unconscionability and ultimately obtaining judgement for damages. 
Plaintiff is therefore awarded attorney fees for work directly related to the breach of the 
agreement and resultant damages, but not for work done on the question of UCSPA 
application. Defendant is not awarded attorney fees because they did not prevail on the 
question of contractual breach nor violation of the UCSPA. This apportionment is done to 
more accurately reflect the relative success of the parties in pursuing their claims under the 
rental agreement. 
Upon submission of an affidavit reflecting attorney fees, judgement will be entered for 
$389.00 plus attorney fees, absent an objection by Defendant as to the reasonableness of the 
requested fees. 
Dated this /^ day of November, 1993. 
/ 
William'A! Thorne, Jr. 
Circuit Court Judge 
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